Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution by Fessha, Yonatan Tesfaye
Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism: Part of
the Problem or Part of the Solution
Yonatan Fessha 2019-01-23T19:48:47
Lenin once famously said that ‘[t]here are decades where nothing happens; and
there are weeks where decades happen’. This aptly describes the dizzying political
sea change that Ethiopia has been going through since 2 April 2018, the day that
saw the election of Abiy Ahmed as the Prime Minister. Since then, the country
has witnessed political reforms that, if sustained, will soon herald a new era of
democratization and human rights. The media is now relatively free. The judiciary
is headed by a prominent women’s rights activist. The electoral commission is now
led by a former judge and leading opposition figure who was once jailed and exiled
for her role in the disputed election of 2005 that led to the deaths of hundreds of
people. A committee of independent experts has been established to revise laws that
undermined human rights and democratization.
The demand for political and constitutional reforms is further intensifying. The
Guardian has recently advised the Prime Minister to support his reforms with ‘a
proper political map and institutional backing’. In particular, the ethnic federalism
that the country introduced in 1991 has attracted significant attention. Although
many agree that federalism should be part of the way ahead, the ethnic nature of the
federation has not been without controversy. Some have called for a constitutional
reform that dismantles ethnic federalism and replaces it with other models of
federalism. Although one may agree with the worrying effects of Ethiopia’s ethnic
federalism, the alternatives that some are prescribing are equally worrying.
Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism
Upon a quick glance, the political map of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia betrays its major foundation: Ethnicity. Unlike other federations, where
geography or administrative conveniences have been used to organize the
federation, Ethiopia has opted to take ethnicity as the point of departure for the
remaking of the Ethiopian map. Although unusual, this was not totally unexpected.
The forces that were sitting around the national table to negotiate the reordering of
the Ethiopian state in 1991 were ethnic-based political parties and liberation fronts.
For them, the primary question that needed to be addressed in post-military Ethiopia
was the nationalities’ question – the claim that the making of the Ethiopian state was
predicated on the suppression of the cultural and political aspirations of the ethnic
communities that inhabit the country. Ethnicity, they declared, should be the basis for
the reorganization of the Ethiopian state. It is that consensus that found its way into
the current Constitution.
The federal experiment saw the creation of nine regional states. The ethnic
foundation of the federation is particularly apparent in five of its nine states. This
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is not only because each of them is predominantly inhabited by one particular
ethnic group. They are also named after the dominant ethnic group inhabiting the
territory. Ethnic trait is not completely absent in the makeup of the remaining four
states. Although these are not predominantly inhabited by one ethnic group, the
designations of some of these states and their internal organizational structure, that
includes ethnic-based local governments, indicates that ethnicity is taken seriously in
the political and organizational make-up of the states.
The problem with the Ethiopian federalism is not that it is sensitive to ethnic
concerns or that it takes ethnic bonds into account in the making of Ethiopia’s federal
structure. The attempt to build the identity of the state along a single language, for
example, has not fully succeeded. There was also no success in making ethnicity
a non-issue in the political discourse of the country. Given the political relevance
that ethnicity has achieved in the country, the history of ethnic-based conflicts and a
nation-state building project that has not fully succeeded, it was unavoidable that
the country needed to come to terms with the ethnic tensions that characterized
its political history. A constitutional design that is sensitive to ethnic concerns was
unavoidable, if not desirable.
And to be fair, the system has not been without its benefits. The decision of the
Ethiopian state to take ethnicity seriously, perhaps too seriously, in the political and
geographical reconfiguration of the country has undeniably promoted the cultural
and political status of groups that were hitherto marginalized in the past. The cultural
upliftment is particularly palpable. A country that for ages used only one language
as an official language of communication has now given way to a federation whose
constituent units use different languages for the purpose of government business
within their respective boundaries. That has extended to the education sector where
many languages are now used as medium of instruction at least in the early stages
of most primary schools. Perhaps the most colorful manifestation of the cultural
upliftment comes in the form of the reintroduction of annual traditional celebrations
that are attracting thousands of people and are taking the form of ‘carnival’ or ‘street
festival’. The political upliftment is not equally palpable. In as much as the system
provides opportunities for communities to manage their own affairs, true and full
empowerment of communities has remained elusive.
The original sin of the Ethiopian federalism is, however, that it has made ethnicity
the exclusive basis for state organization. The federation is organized as if ethnicity
is the only political identity that matters. This has elevated ethnicity into a primary
political identity based on which political competition or cooperation should be
conducted. This is the reason why, when the new prime minister recently met with
the leaders of about 81 political parties, more than two third of them were ethnic-
based parties. It is also the reason why the country is currently facing a floodgate of
demands by ethnic groups to have their own state. It is also because of the elevation
of ethnicity to a primary political identity that the federation has to continuously
entertain demands from some ethnic groups that, in search of ‘their homeland’, are
demanding to be transferred from one state to another as the system has left them
with the feeling of being outsiders in the area they have traditionally inhabited. It has
also relegated millions of individuals to second-class citizens. Individuals that do not
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belong to the locally empowered group often face discrimination in areas of political
rights, employment and other benefits offered by the states.
The alternative
Some are recommending that Ethiopia dismantle ethnic federalism and move
towards a territorial federalism that does not take ethnic bonds into account. The
prescription to move towards a territorial federalism is, however, a non-starter, at
least for now. A proposal to introduce a model of federalism that totally ignores
communal bonds is exactly what the protesters ‘that brought the government
down’ do not want to see. Ethiopia was rocked by protests for three years not
because of ethnic federalism. The young people in Oromia, home to the Oromo,
the largest ethnic group in the country, took to the street not because they were
concerned of the deepening ethnic tensions that accompanied the introduction
of ethnic federalism. They protested because they felt the empowerment of their
ethnic community as promised by the constitution has not been fulfilled. What
they requested was not to do away with the consecration of ethnic considerations
in constitutional terms. They were rather demanding greater fidelity to the ethnic
aspects of the federal constitution. A prescription to move towards territorial
federalism might thus appear imprudent given the protests that spread like wild fire
across cities and communities in Oromia were primarily driven by the demand for
more ‘ethnic federalism’.
Territorial federalism might have been a viable path in 1991, long before ethnic
federalism took root. Now, Ethiopia is a country with 27 years’ history of ethnic
federalism and a living example to the adage that ‘it is not identities that create
territories but territories that create identities’. There might not have been an Oromo
nation. Thanks to ethnic federalism, the Oromo, who had always had an uneasy
relationship with the state, have now lived under a single Oromo state that has used
its full resources to promote the idea of an Oromo nation. A territorial federalism
that completely does away with an Oromo state in any near future might send the
country into a spiral tensions from which it might be difficult to emerge. Apart from
the Oromo, even the Amhara, the second largest ethnic group which is usually seen
as an embodiment of Ethiopian nationalism, is so much gripped by the fervor of
Amhara nationalism that any talk of eliminating the eponymous state would just not
go well. The same would be true in Tigray and Somali state, home to the Tigre and
Somali, the two other large ethnic groups in the country. Given the current political
reality, a call for territorial federalism would simply mean adding fuel to the fire.
For now, the time for territorial federalism has passed and remains a rather distant
possibility. This is not to suggest that ethnic federalism is the only response to ethnic
concerns as it is not the only model of federalism that can take ethnic concerns
seriously. What Ethiopia needs is a system that accommodates ethnic concerns
while at the same time recognizing the sense of communal bond that Ethiopians
enjoy beyond their ethnic groups. What is needed is a model that takes ethnic
concerns into account without making ethnic identity the only identity that matters.
The institutional imaginations of Ethiopians and those who care about Ethiopia
should not be limited to ethnic and territorial federalism.
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